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MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE
To the extent that future practice under the new rules will lead to
change in the rules, any movement toward greater consistency be-
tween language and application of the state and federal rules can only
strengthen them. In particular, the general objection requirement
should be changed to place Maryland practice squarely in conform-
ance with federal practice.
DINAH S. LEVENTHAL
D. What Is a "Crime Relevant to Credibility"?
Evidence of a person's character' is generally not admissible in
court,' however, there are many exceptions to this general rule.3 One
of these exceptions, evidence of a prior conviction used to impeach
credibility, has long been recognized in one form or another.4 This
exception was codified most recently in Maryland Rule 5-609.' Rule 5-
609 does not change existing Maryland law significantly, yet its silence
on exactly which crimes are relevant to credibility will continue to pro-
mote substantial litigation on the matter.
1. "Character... means the aggregate of a person's traits, including those relating to
care and skill and their opposites." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 304 (1942).
2. See MD. R. 5-404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character ... is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... .").
3. See, e.g., MD. R. 5-404(a) (1) (A) ("Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of an
accused offered by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same" is admissible).
4. See discussion infra Part 1.
5. Rule 5-609 provides:
Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime:
(a) Generally.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
the witness or established by public record during examination of the witness, but
only if (1) the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the wit-
ness's credibility and (2) the court determines that the probative value of admit-
ting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the
objecting party.
(b) Time Limit.-Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this Rule if a
period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction.
(c) Other Limitatioms.-Evidence of a conviction otherwise admissible under sec-
tion (a) of this Rule shall be excluded if:
(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated;
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or
(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from thejudgment of convic-
tion is pending, or the time for noting an appeal or filing an application for leave
to appeal has not expired.
(d) Effect of Plea of Nolo Contendere.-For purposes of this Rule, "conviction" in-





1. Rationale for Maryland Rule 5-609.--Since the late 1600s, re-
strictions have been placed on witnesses who have been convicted of a
crime.' Initially, the restriction was a prohibition on testimony and
considered part of the punishment for the crime.7 "Nevertheless, in
whatever degree the disqualification may have been thought of as a
part of the punishment of the offender himself, it was obvious that
this theory could not of itself justify the incidental punishment of in-
nocent persons who might need the convict's testimony.... ."8 Thus,
the theory upon which the restriction rested became one of credibil-
ity; the "desired inference is that a person who commits a criminal
offense is likely-or at least more likely than one who has not commit-
ted such an act-to give false testimony."9 This theory maintained the
common law doctrine that declared a convicted person incompe-
tent. l° In the 1800s, the prohibition was transformed into a method
of impeaching the credibility of a witness."
Legislators, however, failed to restrict evidence of prior convic-
tions to those crimes directly relating to a witness's credibility, 12 an
oversight which exposed other weaknesses of this method of impeach-
ment. The use of a prior conviction might "predicate the witness's
unreliability on the basis of a single act even though this act may be
atypical of the witness's character."1 " Divulgence of a criminal back-
ground also "may make the possessors of a criminal record reluctant
to testify... to the detriment of the judicial system's interest."' 4 Even
greater risks exist when the witness with a conviction is also a party to
the action. The conviction may be "translated into finding him guilty
or liable without regard to whether he, in fact, committed the act with
which he is charged.""5 Although this combination of low probative
value and a high possibility of prejudice has led to demands for re-
form,' 6 the rule remains intact "because of an unwillingness among
courts and legislators to allow [a witness] to appear as a truthful per-
6. See 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAw § 519 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1979).
7. 2 id. § 519, at 726.
8. 2 id.
9. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 81, at 286 (1978).
10. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 519, at 727.
11. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 609[02]
(1994) (discussing the premise that underlies the use of prior convictions to impeach wit-
nesses as a presumption "that a person who has been convicted is unworthy of belief").
12. 3 id.
.13. 3 id. at 609-30.
14. 3 id.
15. 3 id.
16. 3 id. at 609-32.
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son when his record of convictions, if made known to the jury, would
cast serious doubt on his testimony. " 17
2. Historical Development of Maryland Rule 5-609.-At common
law, only potential witnesses who had been convicted of infamous
crimes were deemed incompetent to testify. 8 Infamous crimes in-
cluded treason, any felony, misdemeanors involving dishonesty (cri-
men falsi), and obstruction of justice.19 Today, states principally rely
upon statutes or rules to allow prior convictions as a ground for im-
peachment of credibility.20
The Maryland General Assembly first addressed the common-law
rule in Chapter 109 of the Acts of 18641 by removing the common-
law disqualification of witnesses with prior convictions.22 The legisla-
ture did not entirely remove the stigma of a prior conviction. Rather
than allow "these witnesses to testify free from the taint of their prior
infamous convictions, the legislature chose to make these convictions
admissible for impeachment purposes."2 1 The statute has retained its
original substance for over 125 years, most recently reformulated in
Section 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,24 which
allows the admission of evidence of conviction of infamous crimes for
impeachment purposes. 5
17. Ia.is, supra note 9, § 81, at 292.
18. 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCoRImcK].
19. 1 id.
20. 1 id.
21. See Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 358, 535 A.2d 445, 450 (1988) (tracing the roots of
impeachment by prior conviction in Maryland).
22. Id. at 359, 535 A.2d at 450.
23. Id.
24. Section 10-905 provides:
(a) In general-Evidence is admissible to prove the interest of a witness in
any proceeding, or the fact of his conviction of an infamous crime. Evidence of
conviction is not admissible if an appeal is pending, or the time for an appeal has
not expired, or the conviction has been reversed, and there has been no retrial or
reconviction.
(b) CQei#icate under seat as evidenme-The certificate, under the seal of the
clerk of the court, of the court in which the conviction occurred is sufficient
evidence of the conviction.
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 10-905 (1989).
25. See Prou*, 311 Md. at 359, 535 A.2d at 450.
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Although the phrase "infamous crimes" is generally thought to be
well-defined,26 Maryland courts have struggled with it. In a 1927 case,
Nelson v. Seiler,27 the Court of Appeals reasoned:
It is not required that the evidence [of conviction of a crime
to impeach a witness] be restricted to infamous crimes or
those involving moral turpitude on the one hand, but, on
the other, the purpose of the admission, to impeach credibil-
ity, must impose some limits; the convictions should be of
infringements of the law that may have some tendency to im-
peach credibility, and not all infringements do.2 8
In 1981, the Court of Appeals adopted this concept of a crime of
moral turpitude as a separate category of crimes relevant to credibil-
ity.29 Seven years later, the court concluded that "the drafters of this
legislation had no intention of creating a class of infamous crime
known as a crime of moral turpitude."" ° When considering the admis-
sibility of evidence of conviction of a crime other than an infamous
crime, trial judges were instructed to make a reasoned judgment as to
whether the offense was one that affected the defendant's credibility;
if it did not, it was inadmissible for purposes of impeachment."1
OnJanuary 1, 1992, Maryland Rule 1-50232 became the governing
rule for impeachment by prior conviction, "trump[ing]" Section 10-
26. See id. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452 (stating that infamous crimes include common-law
felonies and crimen falsi); see also Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 383, 62 A. 631, 633 (1905)
(stating that crimes that common law regarded as infamous included "treason, felony, per-
jury, forgery and those other offenses, classified generally as crimenfalsz"); HYMAN GINSBERG
& ISIDORE GINSBERG, CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 5 (1940) ("Infamous
crimes in Maryland embrace treason, felonies and those misdemeanors which are founded
in fraud."); 1 McCoRMIc, supra note 18, § 42 ("[T]reason or any felony, or. .. a misde-
meanor involving dishonesty or false statement (crimen falsi), or the obstruction ofjustice
... were said to be 'infamous' crimes.").
27. Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927).
28. Id. at 69, 139 A. at 566.
29. See Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 711, 436 A.2d 906, 912 (1981) ("Moral turpitude,
while being somewhat less specific than infamous crimes .... connotes such a disregard for
social values on the part of the perpetrator, that one could reasonably infer that such a
person's testimony is suspect.").
30. Prut, 311 Md. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452.
31. Id.
32. Rule 1-502 provided:
(a) Genera/ly.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
the witness or established by public record during cross-examination, but only if
the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the wimess's credibil-
ity and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party.
(b) Time Limit.-Evidence of a conviction under this Rule is not admissible if a
period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction.
1128 [VOL. 54:1032
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905 of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article."3 Rule 1-502 made
several significant changes in Maryland law. First, the Rule required
the trial judge to balance probative value with prejudicial effect for all
prior convictions, including convictions for infamous crimes.3 4 Under
Section 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and
then-existing Maryland case law, this balancing test applied only if the
conviction was for other than an infamous crime. Second, Rule 1-502
declared inadmissible evidence of any conviction that occurred more
than fifteen years prior to the testimony, 5 whereas no specific time
limit had existed previously. Third, Rule 1-502 clarified the handling
of nolo contendere pleas, stating that such pleas followed by a sen-
tence were convictions for purposes of the rule. 6 As a result of these
changes, the Court of Appeals noted:
[R]ule 1-502 essentially create[d] a three-part test .... First,
subsection (a) set forth the "eligible universe" for what con-
victions may be used to impeach a witness's credibility. This
universe consist[ed] of two categories: (1) "infamous
crimes" and (2) "other crimes relevant to the witness's credi-
bility." . . . If a crime d[id] not fall within one of the two
categories, then it [was] inadmissible and the analysis
end[ed]....
If the crime [fell] within one of the two categories in the
eligible universe, then the second step [was] for the propo-
nent to [satisfy the conditions in sections (b) and (c)]. Fi-
nally .... the trial court must determine that the probative
value of the prior conviction outweigh [ed] the danger of un-
fair prejudice to the witness or objecting party.3 7
(c) Other Limitations.-Evidence of a conviction otherwise admissible under sec-
tion (a) of this Rule shall be excluded if:
(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated;
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or
(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from the judgment of convic-
tion is pending, or the time for noting an appeal or filing an application for leave
to appeal has not expired.
(d) Effect of Plea of Nolo Contendere.-For purposes of this Rule, "conviction" in-
cludes a plea of nolo contendere followed by a sentence, whether or not the
sentence is suspended.
MD. R. 1-502 (rescinded 1994).
33. SeeJOSEPH- F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1302(B), at 647 (2d
ed. 1993).
34. LYNN MCLAJN, MARYLAND RuLzs OF EVIDENCE § 2.609.2 (1994).
35. Id.
36. Id.




While Rule 1-502 clarified many aspects of the use of prior convictions
to impeach a witness's testimony, it did not address the most problem-
atic area: exactly which crimes were admissible for impeachment pur-
poses? The list of "infamous crimes" was relatively clear 3 but a
definition of the "lesser crimes relative to a person's credibility" re-
mained elusive.39
On December 15, 1993, the Court of Appeals adopted Title 5 of
the Maryland Rules-Evidence, 4° which became effective on July 1,
1994.41 Maryland Rule 1-502 was replaced by the virtually identical
Maryland Rule 5-609. One difference between the two rules is that
Rule 5-609(a) uses the phrase "during examination" rather than "on
cross examination."4" This allows convictions to be brought out on
direct examination to "draw the sting," permitting the impeachment
of one's own witness in accordance with Rule 5-607. 43 Maryland Rule
5-609 also delineated paragraph (a) into subsections (1) and (2).
This change in form clarifies that the balancing test of paragraph (a)
applies to both infamous crimes and lesser crimes.44
38. See supra note 26.
39. Compare Wallach v. Board of Educ., 99 Md. App. 386, 392, 637 A.2d 859, 862 (find-
ing a conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana "is not admissible for impeachment
purposes, and its admission constitutes reversible error"), cert. granted, 336 Md. 98, 646
A.2d 1019 (1994) with State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 217, 642 A.2d 870, 876 (1994) (hold-
ing that "a prior conviction for distribution of cocaine is relevant to credibility and as such
is admissible for impeachment purposes"), revg97 Md. App. 582, 592, 631 A.2d 499, 504
(1993) (concluding "that distribution of a controlled dangerous substance is not a crime
relevant to credibility and may not, therefore, be used under Rule 1-502 for impeachment
purposes").
40. 21 Md. Reg. 1 (Jan. 7, 1994).
41. Id. The new rules apply to all trials commencing after July 1, 1994.
42. MD. R. 5-609(a).
43. MCLAN, supra note 34, § 2.609.1. The Committee note reflects this difference, stat-
ing that "[t]he requirement that the conviction, when offered for purposes of impeach-
ment, be brought out during examination of the witness is for the protection of the
witness. It does not apply to impeachment by evidence of prior conviction of a hearsay
declarant who does not testify." MD. R. 609 committee note (1994). The Committee note
that followed old Rule 1-502(a) had originally stated "[tihe requirement that the convic-
tion, when offered for purposes of impeachment, be brought out during cross-examina-
tion is for the protection of the witness and is not intended either to authorize or to
preclude the party calling the witness from bringing out the conviction on direct examina-
tion." MD. R. 1-502 committee note (1994).
44. McLAIN, supra note 34, § 2.609.1. This change in form codified the result reached
by the Court of Appeals in Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 619 A.2d 105 (1993), in which the
court stated "the rule aims to impose a weighing of probative value against unfair prejudice
for all convictions used to impeach ... [and] ... abandons every vestige of per se admissi-
bility regarding evidence of prior convictions for the purposes of impeachment." Id. at
272-73, 619 A.2d at 109-10. The State had argued in Bea/s that if the prior conviction in
question was for an infamous crime, that conviction should automatically be admitted for
impeachment purposes, and that the discretionary balancing test was required only when
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3. A Comparison: Maryland Rule 5-609 and Federal Rule of Evidence
609.-The new Maryland Rules of Evidence are patterned generally
after the Federal Rules of Evidence.45 Rule 5-609, however, differs
substantially from its federal counterpart by virtue of its more specific
and more restrictive language.
Federal Rule 6091 uses two categories of prior convictions:
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement and felonies, that is,
crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year.47
the conviction in question was for a lesser crime dealing with credibility. Id. at 270, 619
A.2d at 108.
45. Court of Appeals of Maryland Rules Order, 21 Md. Reg. 1 (Jan. 7, 1994) (Chasa-
now, J., dissenting in part).
46. Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime:
(a) General nde.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admit-
ted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time Limit.-Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests ofjustice,
that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circum-
stances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a con-
viction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to
use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest
the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation.-Evidence of a convic-
tion is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of
a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure
based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person
has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of
a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of
innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudicatio.ns-Evidence ofjuvenile adjudications is generally not ad-
missible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evi-
dence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the
court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination
of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal-The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is
admissible.
FED. R. EVID. 609.
47. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
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Convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement of any
witness, including the accused, are automatically admissible.4" Con-
victions of felonies of a witness other than the accused are subject to
the balancing test of Federal Rule 403.19 If the accused has been con-
victed of a felony, evidence of "such a crime shall be admitted if the
... probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused."5° The Maryland Rule, on the other hand,
utilizes different categories of crimes and requires a balancing of
probativeness versus prejudice as to all prior convictions.
Under the Federal Rule, evidence of a prior conviction is not ad-
missible if more than ten years has passed since the latter of the date
of conviction or the date of release from prison.5" This limit to admis-
sibility, however, can be hurdled by demonstrating that the "probative
value of the conviction . . . substantially outweighs its prejudicial ef-
fect."52 The Maryland Rule strictly prohibits evidence of a conviction
48. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (2). "The admission of prior convictions involving dishonesty
and false statement is not within the discretion of the Court. Such convictions are pecu-
liarly probative of credibility and.., are always to be admitted." FED. R. Evin. 609 Report
of the House and Senate Conferees, reprinted in 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M.
MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 680 (5th ed. 1990).
49. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides in pertinent part:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... " FED. R. EVID. 403. The reference to this
rule was added by a 1990 amendment. Prior to that amendment, Rule 609 stated that
"evidence . . . shall be admitted ... if the crime [was a felony] and the court determines
that the probative value . . . outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. . . ." FED. R.
EVID. 609(a) (1989) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court interpreted this language to
mean that government witnesses in criminal trials and all witnesses in civil litigation were
not subject to the balancing test for prejudice because there was no possibility of prejudice
to the defendant by admitting evidence of the prior conviction of a witness other than the
defendant. The Court held that "only the accused in a criminal case [is] protected from
unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1)." Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989). Under the 1990 amendment to Rule 609, "Rule 403 now
clearly protects against unfair impeachment of any defense witness other than the defend-
ant[, as well as protecting all] other litigants from unfair impeachment of their witnesses."
FED. R. EVID. 609(a) advisory committee's note. The Maryland Rule addresses this prob-
lem by making the balancing test applicable to all crimes and requiring the probative value
to outweigh the "danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party," thereby
protecting all witnesses and litigants equally. MD. R. 5-609(a) (emphasis added).
50. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1). This balancing test, as applied to prior felony convictions
of a defendant, places the burden on the government to prove that the probative value
outweighs the prejudicial effect. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) advisory committee note (1990
amendment). This differs from the balancing test applied by Rule 403 to felony convic-
tions of all other witnesses, which places the burden on the party opposing introduction of
the evidence to demonstrate that danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value. Id.
51. FED. R. EvID. 609(b).
52. Id. Additionally, evidence of a conviction older than 10 years is admissible only if
the adverse party is given sufficient written notice of intent to use such evidence, and the
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that occurred more than fifteen years prior to the proposed
testimony. 3
Both the Maryland and Federal Rules exclude some otherwise ad-
missible evidence of convictions based on post-conviction action. Fed-
eral Rule 609 excludes evidence of a conviction if it was pardoned,
annulled, or otherwise overturned based on a finding of the rehabili-
tation of the person convicted.54 The Rule also excludes evidence of a
conviction that has been the "subject of a pardon, annulment or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence."5 5 Under the
Maryland Rule, evidence of a conviction that has been subject to a
pardon of any type is excluded.56 The Maryland Rule also excludes
evidence of a conviction if an appeal is pending or the time for an
appeal has not lapsed.57 The Federal Rule allows evidence of the ap-
peal to be introduced, but does not exclude evidence of a conviction
based on its appellate status.58 Finally, the Maryland Rule excludes
evidence of a conviction that has been reversed or vacated, ° while the
Federal Rule is silent on the subject.
4. Analysis. -Maryland Rule 5-609, while patterned after Federal
Rule of Evidence 609, has benefitted considerably from nearly twenty-
five years of federal litigation. The Maryland Rule did not, however,
follow the example set by the Federal Rule which more clearly deline-
ates the crimes subject to the rule. This oversight is the single major
weakness of Maryland Rule 5-609.
"One of the primary purposes for enacting a set of evidentiary
rules is to present precise answers to frequently posed questions. " '
Maryland's adaptation of the Federal Rule provides this guidance by
the establishment of a bright line test to govern the admissibility of
older convictions, 6 ' by the clear description of post-conviction action
adverse party must have a fair opportunity to argue against the admissibility of such evi-
dence. Id.
53. MD. R. 5-609(b).
54. See FED. R. EVID. 609(c).
55. Id.
56. MD. R. 5-609(c)(2).
57. MD. R 5-609(c)(3).
58. See FED. R. EvID. 609(e).
59. MD. R. 5-609(c)(1).
60. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 534 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
61. Previously, the length of time since the prior conviction was one factor that the trial
judge considered when deciding the admissibility of a lesser crime used to impeach the
credibility of a witness. Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 708, 436 A.2d 906, 910 (1981).
Infamous crimes were per se admissible and no time limit applied. Kirby v. State, 48 Md.
App. 205, 209, 426 A.2d 423, 426 (1981) (concluding that defendant's 25-year old sodomy
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that deem convictions inadmissible for impeachment,6 2 and by the ex-
plicit statement that nolo contendere pleas followed by sentences are
considered convictions for the purposes of the Rule.63 Maryland Rule
5-609 fails, however, to define clearly and exactly which crimes are
relevant to a witness's credibility as well as what factors bear upon that
determination.
Although a "codification should be so wrought that it supplies
answers to a lawyer's questions simpler, more comprehensible, and
more easily found than the lawyer could discover without the codifica-
tion,"' the Maryland courts have already demonstrated that Maryland
Rule 5-609 provides no simple, comprehensible, easily found answer
to the question of which crimes are relevant to credibility.
6 5
This difficulty is well illustrated by the recent decision by the
Court of Appeals in State v. Giddens.' In Giddens, the defendant was
tried and convicted for assault by ajury in the Circuit Court for Kent
County in November 1992.67 The State's case consisted of the testi-
mony of the victim and corroborating testimony from the victim's girl-
friend.' Giddens denied the incident, claiming that the victim
identified the wrong person.69 Upon learning that the defendant
would testify in his own behalf, the prosecutor informed the court that
the State would impeach the defendant's credibility by introducing
evidence of a 1989 conviction for distribution of cocaine.70 Over de-
fense objection, the trial judge ruled this evidence admissible under
conviction was admissible to impeach his credibility in trial for assault and assault with
intent to rape).
62. Prior to the adoption of Maryland Rule 1-502, Maryland had not "addressed specifi-
cally the question of the admissibility of convictions if the individual [had] received a par-
don, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation with regard to it." 6 LvN MCLAIN,
MARYLAND PRACTICE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL § 609.5 (1987). Section 10-
905 of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article addressed post-conviction action only by
stating that "[e]vidence of conviction is not admissible if an appeal is pending, or the time
for an appeal has not expired, or the conviction has been reversed, and there has been no
retrial or reconviction." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-905(a) (1989); see supra
notes 24-26.
63. See 6 McL4N, supra note 62, § 609.1 at 22 (Supp. 1994).
64. Irving Younger, Introdution to Symposium, The Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 251, 252 (1984).
65. See, e.g., State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994). The court in Giddens
was struggling to define a "crime relevant to credibility" under Maryland Rule 1-502; how-
ever, as discussed in Part 2, supra, that rule is virtually identical to Maryland Rule 5-609 and
any differences between them have no effect on the discussion.
66. 333 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994).
67. Id. at 208, 642 A.2d at 871.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 208-09, 642 A.2d at 871-72.
1134 [VOL. 54:1032
MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE
Maryland Rule 1-502.71 The trial judge found that the crime met the
requirement for felonious intent, involved conduct that was "'base or
vile and contrary to the accepted and customary conduct between
men' and, therefore, was a crime of moral turpitude.7 2 After con-
ducting the required balancing test, the trial judge admitted the
evidence.73
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court
in a split decision.74 ChiefJudge Wilner reasoned that whatever deter-
mines whether a crime is relevant to credibility, it is "not determined
by whether the crime in question is a felony or by whether it involves
moral turpitude."7' The court found that distribution of cocaine was
not a crime relevant to credibility because "[d]istribution of a con-
trolled dangerous substance . . . does not, inherently and of itself,
indicate that the person is not to be believed"76 and "[d] rug distribu-
tion, even when engaged in for profit, is not necessarily surreptitious
or furtive."77
Judge Motz reluctantly concurred, but wrote that the "Court of
Appeals' precedent requires reversal,"78 although "if [this court] were
writing on a clean slate, it would certainly be my view that a conviction
of distribution of a controlled substance is admissible for impeach-
ment purposes in at least some circumstances." 7
Judge Murphy dissented on the grounds that, as a matter of law, a
"conviction for distribution of cocaine is relevant to a person's credi-
bility."8" His dissent followed the trial judge's analysis that the crime
was both one of moral turpitude and a felony relevant to the defend-
71. Id. at 209, 642 A.2d at 872.
72. I& (quoting the trial record).
73. Id.
74. Giddens v. State, 97 Md. App. 582, 631 A.2d 499 (1993), rev'd, 335 Md. 205, 642
A.2d 870 (1994).
75. Id. at 588, 631 A.2d at 502.
76. Id. at 591, 631 A.2d at 503; see aLso Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 713, 436 A.2d 906,
913 (1981) ("If the crime is so ill-defined that it causes the factfinder to speculate as to
what conduct is impacting on the defendant's credibility, it should be excluded.").
77. Giddens, 97 Md. App. at 592, 631 A.2d at 503. The underlying facts of the crime are
not admissible: "[It is the crime itself, as defined in the law, that must have a special
relevance to credibility, not the particular manner in which the crime was committed." Id.
at 592 n.2, 631 A.2d at 504 n.2.
78. Id. at 594, 631 A.2d at 504 (Motz, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 593, 631 A.2d at 504. Judge Motz's belief that Court of Appeals precedent
determined that distribution of a controlled substance was not a crime relevant to credibil-
ity further illustrates the confusion that exists in this area, even among the appellate judges
of Maryland. In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals did not agree with her
interpretation of precedent but insisted it was not overruling itself. See State v. Giddens,
335 Md. 205, 213-18, 642 A.2d 870, 874-76 (1994).
80. Giddens, 97 Md. App. at 594, 631 A.2d at 505 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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ant's credibility."1 The dissent also supported the notion that the de-
fendant could have discussed the circumstances of his conviction in
an attempt to mitigate the effects of its admission. 2
The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the Court of Special
Appeals, holding that "the trial court properly admitted Giddens's
prior conviction for distribution of cocaine for the limited purpose of
impeaching his credibility."8 3 The court discussed the application of
Maryland Rule 1-502 and noted that, while "a prior conviction for sim-
ple possession of narcotics has no bearing on credibility," 4 the court
had never "expressly considered whether a conviction for drug deal-
ing..., is probative of a lack of veracity." 5 The court then decided
that an "individual convicted of cocaine distribution would be willing
to lie under oath . . . '[because that individual] lives a life of secrecy
and dissembling in the course of that activity, being prepared to say
whatever is required by the demands of the moment, whether the
truth or a lie."'" 6
The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by Giddens's argument
that "some activity which has little bearing on truthfulness, such as
passing a marijuana cigarette to a friend at a party or concert, is in-
cluded within the technical definition of drug distribution,"' nor did
they believe that "[t]he crime of cocaine distribution is ... so 'ill-
defined' that a jury would have difficulty determining the precise na-
ture of the offense.""8 Finally, the Court of Appeals said that the trial
court, although improperly using the term "moral turpitude," "prop-
erly weighed the probative value against the danger of prejudice." 9
The dissenting judges agreed with the opinion below of Chief Judge
Wilner.90
81. Id.
82. Id. at 595, 436 A.2d at 505.
83. State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 222, 642 A.2d 870, 878 (1994).
84. Id. at 216, 642 A.2d at 875.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 217, 642 A.2d at 876 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897 (1977)).
87. Id. at 218, 642 A.2d at 876.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 221, 642 A.2d at 878. The Court of Appeals, although reversing the Court of
Special Appeals, did not agree entirely with Judge Murphy's dissent below, reiterating that
only the name of the conviction, the date of the conviction, and the sentence imposed
may be introduced to impeach a witness." Id. at 222, 642 A.2d at 878.
90. Id. at 223, 642 A.2d at 878-79 (Eldridge and Bell, JJ., dissenting).
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Unfortunately, the Giddens decision did no more than add one
specific crime to a piecemeal list of crimes relevant to credibility.9 1
The court issued no rules to guide trial judges in this matter of law,
nor did it clarify what information could be used to make the determi-
nation.92 Trial judges and litigants still face the uncertainty of which
unspecified crimes are relevant to credibility. The Court of Appeals
has not satisfied one of the primary purposes for enacting a set of
evidentiary rules: it failed to present a precise answer to this fre-
quently posed question.
This issue, although not addressed by the new Maryland Rules of
Evidence, was considered at a public meeting conducted by the court
on October 24, 1991. a" At that meeting, Chief Judge Murphy noted
that failure to define clearly which crimes are relevant to a person's
credibility "leaves the trial judges ... hanging out there not knowing
... what.., is eligible."94 The court could have adopted a number of
alternatives in Rule 5-609 that would have solved this problem. The
simple deletion of the phrase "other crime relevant to the witness's
credibility" provides one workable solution. This revision would limit
the scope of the Rule to convictions for infamous crimes, similar to
the common-law practice.95
91. See also Carter v. State, 80 Md. App. 686, 693, 56 A.2d 131, 134 (1989) (conviction
for drug manufacturing). For cases specifying crimes not relevant to credibility, see, for
example, Morales v. State, 325 Md. 330, 338-39, 600 A.2d 851, 855 (1992) (possession of
PCP, assault and battery, disorderly conduct, and motor vehicle offenses); Lowery v. State,
292 Md. 2, 2, 437 A.2d 193, 193-94 (1981) (possession of barbiturates); Ricketts v. State,
291 Md. 701, 713-14, 436 A.2d 906, 912-13 (1981) (indecent exposure); Wallach v. Board
of Educ., 99 Md. App. 386, 637 A.2d 859 (conspiracy to distribute marijuana), cert. granted,
336 Md. 98, 646 A.2d 1019 (1994).
92. Giddens, 335 Md. at 213, 642 A.2d at 874 ("This threshold question of whether or
not a crime bears upon credibility is a matter of law.").
93. Id. at 216, 642 A.2d at 875. Although the court was addressing Rule 1-502, the
discussion is equally pertinent to Rule 5-609. The question was apparently not discussed
specifically by the Rules Committee when drafting Rule 5-609. See Minutes of Court of
Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 12, 1993); Minutes
of Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 12,
1993).
94. Giddens, 335 Md. at 216 n.8, 642 A.2d at 875 n.8. The Giddens court, however,
specifically limited its discussion to whether drug distribution and the possession of drugs
with intent to sell were crimes relevant to credibility. The court has subsequently held that
conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute
is admissible for purposes of impeachment. State v. Woodland, No. 94-91, slip op. at 1
(Md. Mar. 9, 1995).
95. There still lingers some question over the exact definition of an "infamous crime."
See Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 270, 619 A.2d 105, 108 (1993) (stating that theft is among
crimen falsi and therefore an infamous crime); Watson v. State, 311 Md. 370, 375, 535 A.2d
455, 458 (1988) (holding that attempted rape is not an infamous crime). Admittedly, this
approach will not completely solve the problem.
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The inclusion within the Rule itself of a complete list of crimes
relevant to credibility would offer another solution. Naturally, the op-
eration of the present Rule will eventually follow this approach as the
Court of Appeals rules on the relevance to credibility on a crime-by-
crime basis, but the list will then exist in case law rather than in the
Rule. The Rules Committee could have easily anticipated this eventu-
ality and avoided the present confusion. The Rules Committee, never-
theless, would have faced the difficult challenge of creating a
satisfactory list of specific crimes relevant to credibility because "'[i] n
a purely philosophical sense[,] . . .all violations of the law, by their
very nature involve some element of dishonesty.'"96
The approach of the Federal Rules-defining a broad category of
crimes that could be considered, such as crimes meeting the defini-
tion of felony-presents another method.9 The advantage to this ap-
proach is that it allows all parties to predict the outcome of a ruling.98
If such an approach were applied to the Maryland Rule, it would oper-
ate as follows:
1. Start with a list of all crimes.
2. Reduce the universe of crimes to include only those
crimes known at common law as infamous crimes and those
crimes meeting the definition of a felony (or otherwise de-
fined category).
3. Remove those crimes whose introduction is more prejudi-
cial than probative.
4. Reduce the universe further by the fifteen-year time limit
and post-conviction action exclusion.
96. Giddens, 335 Md. at 215, 642 A.2d at 875 (quoting Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198,
1204 (Del. 1992)).
97. Unanimous approval of the federal approach by no means exists.
Probably no single Rule provoked as much controversy as Rule 609. There was
support for the common law view. There was also support for the so-called
"Luck" rule, Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), which gave the
Trial Judge the power to balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect
of all prior convictions and which was adopted in almost every Circuit. In the
House of Representatives, the prevailing view was that a prior conviction should
only be introduced if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement.
1 SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 48, at 634. The Federal Rule was a compromise of
many different viewpoints. Id.
98. This method would satisfy Judge McAuliffe's view that "[i]t is neither logical nor
appropriate to permit one judge to find a crime to be [a lesser crime relevant to credibil-
ity] and another judge to find the same crime to [not be a lesser crime relevant to credibil-
ity]." Proutv. State, 311 Md. 348, 367, 535 A.2d 445, 454 (1988) (McAuliffeJ., dissenting).
Trial judges would have the discretion only to balance probativeness versus prejudice. The
way the rule currently operates, different trial judges are likely to rule differently on the
same crime until that specific crime has been addressed by the Court of Appeals.
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If a conviction survives each of these steps, it would be admissible to
use it to impeach the credibility of a witness. It is important to note
that the trial judge still retains the discretion to rule evidence of a
prior conviction inadmissible. 9
A final approach would bar evidence of any prior convictions to
impeach the credibility of a witness. This view received support from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote:
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a
crime, the only ground for disbelieving him which such
proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the
conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general
disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to
lie in the particular case, and thence that he has lied in fact.
The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken,
but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that
conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is
of bad character and unworthy of credit."
Although questions about the relevancy of the evidence continue,1"'
the likelihood for adoption of this alternative approach appears
slim. 102
Although the above proposals might have reduced the potential
problems surrounding Maryland Rule 5-609, they were not adopted.
Since a court's ruling on this question may often determine which
99. An increase in the trial judge's discretion is not necessarily the most favorable solu-
tion. "Thus does the serpent of uncertainty crawl into the Eden of trial administration....
[Slhifting the burden to the judge's discretion raises problems as to the adequacy of his
information or basis upon which to exercise discretion." 1 McCoRMicy, supra note 18, § 42
n.5. Without a discretionary ruling by the judge, however, evidence of a prior conviction
would not be admissible in the absence of a per se admissibility rule. Trial judges, more-
over, make such discretionary rulings on almost every piece of evidence. Therefore, the
increase in the trial judge's discretion would be minimal and more than offset by the re-
duced waste of judicial energy spent in appellate litigation.
Another benefit to this approach is that a ruling on the admission of evidence of a
prior conviction would be reviewable only under an abuse of discretion standard, because
questions of law are already decided by whether the crime fits into the category defined by
the rule. Under the present rule, this decision is discretionary (in the absence of case law
dealing with the same crime), but is subject to a de novo review as a question of law.
100. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
101. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508 n.4, 512 n.1 (1989) (dis-
cussing the continuing debate over the relevancy and fairness of evidence of prior convic-
tion used to impeach a witness).
102. For further analysis on alternative approaches, see LILv, supra note 9, § 81; Addi-
tional Views of Hon. LawrenceJ. Hogan on FED. R. EviD. 609, reprinted in 1 SALTZBURG &
MARTIN, supra note 48, at 675-78.
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witnesses will testify-especially for the defense-parties will continue
to seek rulings in limine10 3
5. Conclusion. -Maryland Rule 5-609 is a result of over 125 years
of common-law and statutory experience with the admissibility of evi-
dence of a prior conviction used to impeach a witness. Yet, this expe-
rience has still not satisfactorily defined which crimes are relevant to
credibility. Maryland Rule 5-609 does little to assist in this effort.
Because Maryland Rule 5-609 did not change Maryland law sub-
stantially, its failure to clarify exactly which crimes are relevant to a
person's credibility will inevitably generate litigation that might other-
wise have been avoided. The Court of Appeals Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure missed the perfect opportunity to
provide a more precise answer to a troublesome and frequently posed
question. As a result, the Court of Appeals will find itself supplying
these answers piece by piece, crime by crime, for many years to come.
JAMES A. PROTIN
103. An in limine decision, of course, benefits the opposing party as well as the trial
judge. The opposing party gains the opportunity to plan its cross examination more effec-
tively. "The advantage to the Trial Judge... is that there is time to consider the delicate
balancing required by [MD. R. 5-609, and it] gives theJudge advance notice of the need for
a ruling and time to prepare a statement." 1 SALTZBURC & MARTIN, supra note 48, at 638.
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